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Abstract 
 
With the rapid growth of sharing economy, there has 
been a bitter controversy on the disruptive nature of 
sharing economy to threaten traditional industry. This 
study examines the impact of ride-sharing services, 
which is one of the most successful business models in 
sharing economy, on taxi industry. Using 
comprehensive data on Uber and taxi transactions in 
New York City from April to September 2014, we find 
that ride-sharing is negatively associated with the 
demand for taxis. Interestingly, this effect is contingent 
upon market- and customer-segments. The negative 
effect of Uber on taxis is mostly driven in Manhattan 
and high-income areas, where most taxis are 
concentrated. Furthermore, our analyses reveal that 
ride-sharing services take more demand of taxi 
customers who pay by cash and who are price-sensitive, 
by providing relative advantages of ride-sharing 
platforms. In addition, taxi customers in groups appear 
to more switch to ride-sharing services. Relevant 
implications for both research and practice are 
discussed. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sharing economy has received notable attention in 
the last few years, and information technology (IT)-
enabled sharing platforms have rapidly expanded. 
According to the research of PwC [37], sharing 
economy grows more than 30% annually, and it is 
expected that the scale of sharing economy would reach 
the scale of traditional economy sectors in 2025. By 
virtue of its dominance in the global market, ride-
sharing has recently come to the forefront of the debate 
on sharing economy. Uber Technologies Inc. (“Uber” 
hereafter), the world’s largest ride-sharing platform, 
rapidly expanded at an unprecedented scale. 
With the rapid growth of sharing economy, there has 
been a growing debate on the disruptive nature of the 
sharing economy to threaten traditional industry [13]. 
The disruptive force of the sharing economy has raised 
challenges for incumbent industries as well as policy 
makers. Zervas et al. [50] suggest that the 10% increase 
of Airbnb listing leads to the 0.39% decrease in hotel 
revenue. In particular, as one of the most successful 
business models in sharing economy, the questions 
about the societal impacts of ride-sharing on taxi 
industry are part of a larger debate over regulation of 
sharing economy [33].  
Despite their enormous societal impacts, there is 
surprisingly little systematic evidence on the 
relationship between ride-sharing and taxi industry. 
Although many detractors and regulators in major cities 
have raised concerns on cannibalization of taxi demand 
by the ride-sharing services, the narrative about the 
competition between ride-sharing services and taxis is 
largely anecdotal. Thus, we have limited understanding 
of how the increased usages of ride-sharing platforms 
affect the demand for taxis. To bridge this gap, this 
study aims at answering the research questions: (1) 
Whether and how much does ride-sharing impact the 
demand for taxis? (2) If so, which customers does ride-
sharing take from the taxi industry? 
It is noteworthy that the effects of IT-enabled new 
services and business models on conventional ones have 
been widely covered in the information systems (IS) 
literature, though these effects are not always negative. 
For instance, Ghose et al. [21] repute a widespread 
concern that IT-enabled used-product market will 
significantly cannibalize new product sales, as 
mentioning that “this proposition, while theoretically 
possible, is based on speculation as opposed to empirical 
evidence.” Danaher et al. [14] also suggest that digital 
distribution channels are poor substitutes for physical 
sales. Hence, quantifying the impact of ride-sharing on 
taxi industry is important not only for practitioners and 
policy makers, but also for researchers. 
Figure 1 shows the trends in Uber and taxi 
transactions in NYC over the period April to September, 
2014. The usage of Uber has doubled during 6 months, 
whereas transactions of taxis have decreased by 
approximately 5%. However, as neither controlling for 
important region- and time-specific heterogeneity nor 
Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2018
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/49970
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-1-9
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
Page 656
reflecting an appropriate econometric model for the 
interplay between Uber and taxis, these patterns of Uber 
and taxis leave it ambiguous whether the demand 
change for taxis can be attributable to the growth of ride-
sharing.  
 
 
Figure 1. Trends in Uber and taxi pickups in NYC 
 
To examine the impact of ride-sharing on taxi 
industry, we use fine-grained datasets on Uber and taxi 
pickup transactions in New York City (NYC) for the 
period April to September 2014 with over 800,000 zip 
code-hour level observations. As our identification 
strategy, we employ three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
regression model to estimate a simultaneous interaction 
between taxi and Uber, enabling us to address a 
potential simultaneous bias. Further, we explore the 
contingent effects depending on market- and customer-
segments to provide deeper understanding of how ride-
sharing services compete with taxis.  
Our findings demonstrate that Uber and taxi are 
directly competing with each other in NYC, as 
consistent with a conventional view. The 10% increase 
in the number of Uber pickups leads to the 0.12% 
decrease in the number of overall taxi pickups in NYC, 
at all reasonable levels of significance. What is most 
striking, though, is that the effect of Uber on taxi 
demand is contingent upon market- and customer-
segments. The negative effect of Uber on taxis is mainly 
driven in Manhattan and high-income areas, where most 
taxis are concentrated. Furthermore, our analyses reveal 
that ride-sharing services take more demand of taxi 
customers who pay by cash and who are price-sensitive, 
by providing relative advantages of ride-sharing 
platforms. In addition, taxi customers in groups appear 
to more switch to ride-sharing services. 
This paper offers the following key contributions. 
First, this is the first study to quantify and provide 
systematic evidence on the impact of ride-sharing on 
taxi market, using a large-scale dataset and an 
appropriate econometric model. This study extends the 
evidence of the sharing economy’s disruptive nature 
into the ride-sharing, though we document distinct 
effects of Uber on taxi demand by region and income 
level. Notably, given that ride-sharing has grown more 
rapidly in outer boroughs and low-income areas (see 
Figure 3), our findings highlight the critical role of ride-
sharing in expanding transportation options for the 
markets underserved by taxis, while not cannibalizing 
the taxi demand. 
Second, we differentiate various types of taxi 
customers and find that the Uber’s impact is different 
depending on customer-segments. In practical terms, 
this study provides managerial implications that ride-
sharing companies need a target marketing strategy to 
effectively capture customer demands depending on 
customer-segments and spatiotemporal characteristics. 
In addition, our findings are also encouraging for taxi 
industry because all markets are not cannibalized by 
ride-sharing services. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In the IS literature, a large stream of studies covers 
the competition between IT-enabled new services and 
conventional (offline) ones. For instance, prior literature 
has paid attention to whether digital goods and digitally 
distributed contents cannibalize the demand for physical 
goods [14, 43]. In addition, many studies investigate 
how the emergence of electronic commerce can affect 
brick-and-mortar stores [4, 7, 8]. In the literature, IT-
enabled services and business models are not always 
substitutes for conventional ones, rather their effects 
have been reported as insignificant or even positive, 
expanding the market without cannibalization for 
conventional services [14, 21]. 
In line with this literature, there is a bitter 
controversy over the disruptive nature of IT-enabled 
sharing economy to threaten traditional industry which 
is mainly based on offline businesses. Zervas et al. [50] 
provide the first systematic evidence of how sharing 
economy competes with traditional industry in the case 
of Airbnb and hotel industry. Using a city-month level 
difference-in-difference setting, they empirically 
investigate the impact of Airbnb’s entry on hotel 
industry, arguing that the 10% increase of Airbnb listing 
affect the 0.39% decrease in hotel revenue. 
Surprisingly, however, there is little systematic 
empirical evidence on the relationship between ride-
sharing and taxi industry, which is one of the most 
successful business models in sharing economy. In the 
absence of rigorous empirical evidence, there are a 
number of mixed opinions in the industry about the 
effect of ride-sharing on taxi demand. FiveThirtyEight, 
an Internet media, compares the frequency of monthly 
taxi pickups in NYC between 2014 and 2015, arguing 
that Uber is taking millions of Manhattan rides away 
from taxis [18]. The Economist [45] also suggests that 
the average price for NYC’s medallions has fallen from 
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one million dollars in 2014 to 0.7 million dollars in 2015. 
However, they claim that “attributing these woes to 
Uber is difficult,” given that Uber is not taxis’ only new 
source of competition because the NYC introduced boro 
taxis and bicycle-sharing systems in 2013. In addition, 
not all Uber passengers would otherwise have hopped in 
a cab. Rayle et al. [39] suggest that 39% of their survey 
participants said that they would have used a taxi if ride-
sharing services were not available.  
However, previous studies have several notable 
limitations to be addressed in this study. First, these 
studies mostly rely on aggregate level data, such as city 
and month level. These results should be suffered from 
aggregation problems and confounding effects. 
Especially, the spatial-temporal variation of taxi and 
Uber is more evident than other markets such as 
accommodation. To the extent that there may be 
variation in the effects depending on region and time, 
understating these spatiotemporal effects and isolating 
the magnitude of them are important in assessing the 
ride-sharing effects. Thus, our granular level data on trip 
record for Uber and taxis in NYC allow us to exploit 
spatiotemporal variations of Uber and taxi transactions, 
and further investigate the distinct effects of ride-
sharing by region and time. 
Second, assessing and quantifying the causal effects 
of ride-sharing on taxi demand poses an empirical 
challenge due to endogeneity, making identification 
difficult. For instance, Wallsten [48] presents the 
evidence of the relationship between Uber’s popularity 
and the decline of consumer complaints per trip about 
taxis in NYC, possibly due to taking away taxi’s 
customers or improving taxis’ service in response to the 
new competition. However, the author also mentions 
that “the data do not make it possible to derive the 
magnitude of the effects of Uber.” Quantifying the 
impact of ride-sharing on taxi industry is essential to 
provide implications for practitioners and policy makers, 
given that it has been subject to much debate among 
them. Hence, with granular level datasets and an 
appropriate econometric technique, this study attempts 
to quantify the impact of ride-sharing on taxi industry. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 
3.1. Competition between ride-sharing and taxi 
  
According to the framework of competitor analysis 
[9], the degree of competition is determined by market 
commonality and resource similarity. Given that ride-
sharing and taxi provide similar riding services for 
customers, it is reasonable to conjecture that the 
increased usages of ride-sharing platforms would reduce 
the demand for taxis.  
Furthermore, the disruptive power of ride-sharing 
stems from the characteristics of online platforms. IT-
enabled platforms could dramatically lower search costs 
[3] and facilitate buyer-seller match, leading to a 
frictionless market [8]. Contrary to taxi services, ride-
sharing platforms facilitate to seamlessly connect 
customers to the nearest driver when they request a ride. 
Reduced search costs could allow people to hire more 
ride-sharing drivers. In addition, people would be more 
likely to use ride-sharing platforms because the ride-
sharing services offer a significant price reduction over 
traditional taxis (e.g., UberX) and are quite easy to use 
and useful; otherwise they would be unlikely to do [22]. 
We thus propose the following hypothesis to be 
empirically tested as a baseline: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Ride-sharing services will be 
negatively associated with the demand for taxis. 
 
3.2. Contingent effects of market segments 
  
The mixed opinions of ride-sharing’s impacts on taxi 
industry may be attributed to not only the absence of 
empirical evidence, but also its contingency depending 
on market- and customer-related factors. The inherent 
feature of online platforms to reduce search costs can 
influence the market commonality, and consequently 
the degree of competition between ride-sharing services 
and taxis. In the taxi market, search costs are substantial 
not only for customers as buyers, but also for drivers as 
sellers. Patron relies on stochastic discovery of a taxi by 
standing on the street. Taxi drivers get around to search 
for uncertain, potential customers across the city if not 
arranged by calls in advance. Due to high search costs, 
taxi drivers tend to be concentrated spatially in 
downtown and temporally during the daytime or rush 
hour, making customer’s search costs higher in the taxi-
sparse areas and time. Hence, the costs for searching taxi 
and ride-sharing services will be low enough to easily 
get both in the taxi-dense areas. Cramer and Krueger [12] 
find that the capacity utilization rates of taxi and Uber 
drivers are much more similar in NYC than in other 
cities. The authors suggest that the high population 
density of NYC supports more efficient matching of 
taxis and passengers through street hailing than is the 
case in other cities. While they do not separate out 
Manhattan from outer boroughs in NYC, their argument 
is valid only in Manhattan where most taxis are 
concentrated (more than 90%). 
On the other hand, contrary to taxi services, ride-
sharing platforms could reduce driver’s search costs, as 
well as customers’ ones, through seamless driver-rider 
match. Ride-sharing platforms facilitate to seamlessly 
connect customers to the nearest driver when they 
request a ride. Using a simulation approach in 
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estimating a dynamic general equilibrium model of the 
taxi market in NYC in 2011-2012, Frechette et al. [19] 
argue that it was estimated to reduce the search time for 
taxis by 9.3 percent if assuming that drivers knew the 
location of the closest passengers, as the case of ride-
sharing platforms. Reduced drivers’ search costs 
increases expected payoffs from driving in the suburbs 
of the city, leading to a broader services provision. 
Figure 2 highlights different geographical patterns of 
taxi and Uber in NYC. The study of University of 
California Transportation Center [39] suggests that wait 
times of on-demand ride services are markedly shorter 
and more consistent that those of taxis in San Francisco. 
In addition, 30% of respondents in their survey said that 
short wait time is the reason why they chose ride-sharing, 
which is the second highest. 
 
 
Figure 2. Uber and taxi pickups in NYC 
Notes: We plot 150,000 random sample from yellow taxi pickups and 
50,000 from boro taxi transactions during April 2014. Uber pickups are 
plotted based on 200,000 random sample during April 2014. 
 
In the taxi-sparse areas, search costs for taxi will be 
higher than those for ride-sharing, making ride-sharing 
and Uber serve different types of customers by their 
marginal values for search costs. On the other hand, in 
the taxi-dense areas, market commonality is high and 
customers would treat the services of ride-sharing and 
taxi similarly, making the competition more intensive. 
According to Chen [9], the competition intensifies when 
market commonality is high; thus, logically, we expect 
that the impact of ride-sharing on taxis will be greater in 
the taxi-dense areas than taxi-sparse areas. This is 
largely consistent with Brynjolfsson et al. [7], who 
suggest that the competition between the Internet 
retailers and brick-and-mortar is much more intensive 
when selling famous products than niche products 
which consumers have a difficulty in finding in a 
traditional offline market. 
For a goal of empirical testing, we operationalize the 
taxi-dense areas as Manhattan in NYC and high-income 
areas. As shown in Figure 2, taxi availability depends on 
boroughs in NYC. In addition, many studies suggest that 
low-income areas are underserved markets by 
traditional transportation such as taxi, and Uber has the 
potential to expand transportation option there. Using a 
controlled study in low-income neighborhoods in Los 
Angeles, Smart et al. [42] show that an app-summoned 
UberX arrives in less than half the time of a telephone-
dispatched taxi, and more reliable with no wait time 
exceeding 30 minutes. Meyer [34] show that Uber are 
expanding transportation options in low-income areas in 
NYC. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of ride-sharing services on 
taxi demand will be greater in Manhattan than outer 
boroughs in NYC. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The effect of ride-sharing services on 
taxi demand will be greater in high-income 
neighborhoods than low-income neighborhoods. 
 
3.3. Contingent effects of customer segments 
  
Consumers face non-negligible costs of switching 
between different services for a new kind of services or 
technologies. In particular, access to IT or smartphones 
may be proffered as a barrier to widespread adoption of 
new ride-sharing services. Given that taxis are operating 
across cities before the introduction of ride-sharing 
services, the switching costs may play a critical role in 
the competition between them. The lower the switching 
costs for ride-sharing are, the more ride-sharing will 
reduce the taxi demand. 
In this study, we propose two factors which could 
influence customers’ switching behavior and 
subsequently the competition between new sharing 
economy platforms and traditional industry: relative 
advantage and perceived risks. Relative advantage 
refers to the degree to which consumers regard an 
alternative service to be superior to the conventional 
service, and it receives tremendous attentions as one of 
the factors to facilitate innovation adoption and 
diffusion [2, 40]. As consumers perceive more 
advantage and usefulness a service or product offers, 
they tend to more adopt and expect more investment in 
learning the service or product [15, 25]. Huang and 
Hsieh [24] suggest that relative advantage directly 
affects the switching costs and their acceptance behavior. 
Thus, we expect that perceived relative advantage may 
influence the switching behavior of taxi customers to 
new ride-sharing services. 
The ride-sharing services have been embraced, in 
part, because it is cashless and its fare is automatically 
charged to rider’s credit card after rolling up to 
destination. Cashless exchange systems make it easy for 
the users to pay seamlessly. Of many features of IT-
enabled ride-sharing platforms, ease of payment was the 
most attractive reasons to use ride-sharing (35% of 
survey respondents), according to a survey of Rayle et 
al. [39]. Furthermore, Uber maintains its policy that 
“tips are not included on Uber’s platforms, and that 
tipping is neither expected nor required” [35], making 
Page 659
Uber more attractive to the price-sensitive customers 
who are not willing to pay large tips. As a form of price 
discrimination, tipping allows some customers to pay 
less than others for the same service, and price-sensitive 
customers are willing to reduce the total cost of services 
by leaving smaller tips [23, 32]. In this regard, we expect 
that taxi customers who pay by cash and price-sensitive 
customers who give a smaller tip percentage (i.e., 
percentage of total fare) will perceive higher relative 
advantage of ride-sharing over taxi, as there’s no riffling 
through wallet for small bills or tips. Therefore, we 
propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Ride-sharing services will reduce the 
demand for taxi customers paying by cash more than 
those paying by credit card. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Ride-sharing services will reduce the 
demand for taxi customers giving a small tip 
percentage more than those giving a large tip 
percentage. 
 
In addition, there are implicit switching costs 
associated with decision biases and risk aversion [10]. 
People who have never used, or have little used a new 
service feel risk toward the new service. This type of 
risk is originated from the uncertainties about the 
service, and it deters risk-averse consumers from 
switching to and accepting new service or technology. 
In the context of peer-to-peer (P2P)-based sharing 
economy, functional and physical risk may play a key 
role in the adoption of the new services because its 
supplier is not firms but individuals. Therefore, people 
who are not familiar with ride-sharing services may 
perceive risk for safety and uncertainty for its utility.  
Decision on technology adoption is made 
collectively by the group through a process of 
communication and negotiation [41], and social 
influence can act as an antecedent to technology 
adoption [46]. There is an extensive social psychology 
literature addressing group versus individual decision 
making [26]. In particular, previous studies suggest that 
people made a decision in group tend to be more risk-
taking than people made a decision alone [44, 47]. Dion 
et al. [16] propose four possible explanations for making 
riskier decision in a group: diffusion of responsibility, 
persuasion, familiarization, and cultural value. That is, 
they share their risk with other people in the group [17]. 
Gardner and Steinberg [20] suggest that when in peer 
groups than alone, the experiment participants took 
more risks and focused more on the benefits than costs 
of risky behavior. In addition, peer influence affects an 
user’s switching intention in social network services [49] 
and increases the impulsive purchasing [31].  
Taken together, to the extent that the perceived risk 
or uncertainty acts as switching costs for ride-sharing 
services, group customers will be more favorable 
toward new technology or services, than individual 
consumers. Thus, we propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Ride-sharing services will reduce the 
demand for taxi customers in group more than those 
alone. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1. Data 
  
In this study, we employ zip code-hour level panel 
data on Uber and taxi pickup transactions in NYC over 
the period from April to September 2014. NYC provides 
an ideal setting for our study because Uber has been 
active there since May 2011, and NYC is today one of 
its biggest and most controversial markets. As of 2015, 
Lyft provided only 7% of rides summoned over the 
Internet in NYC, compared with Uber’s 90% [6]. In 
addition, while yellow cabs still make 10 times more 
trips than Uber cars in the city, more Uber cars were on 
the road than yellow taxis in NYC in 2015 [36]. This 
sample period also rules out the possibility of 
competitors’ influences (such as Lyft) because Uber was 
the market-dominating company in NYC before 2015.  
FiveThirtyEight obtained the Uber transaction data 
from the from NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission 
(TLC) by submitting a Freedom of Information Law 
request. This dataset contains over 4.5 million Uber 
pickups in NYC from April to September 2014. 
Additionally, we use data on approximately 90 million 
taxi pickup transactions for this period from the official 
NYC TLC trip records. Each individual trip record 
contains precise location coordinates and timestamps 
for where and when the trip started.  
Uber and taxi pickup locations are specified in their 
latitude and longitude to four decimal places. To convert 
their locations into zip code level, we match the latitude 
and longitude to the corresponding zip code, using a 
geographical information systems software. Data that 
returned null values or zip codes outside NYC are 
dropped. Our final panel dataset includes 191 zip codes, 
and consequently 838,872 zip code-hour observations. 
It is worth noting that TLC also provides information on 
various attributes of taxi transactions in NYC, allowing 
us to segment customer types. The TLC trip record 
dataset includes transaction information about fare, tip 
amount, number of passenger, and payment method. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in our 
datasets. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics (N = 838,872) 
Variables Mean Std. dev Min Max Description 
Uber 5.04 19.11 0 434 Number of Uber pickup transactions 
Taxi 102.17 267.34 0 3,290 Number of taxi pickup transactions 
Taxi_Large tip 52.14 130.78 0 1,770 Number of taxi transactions whose tip percentage is above median (median = 9.5%) 
Taxi_Small tip 50.00 139.46 0 1,743 Number of taxi transactions whose tip percentage is below median (median = 9.5%) 
Taxi_Group ride 29.07 81.36 0 1,113 Number of taxi transactions whose number of passenger is two or more 
Taxi_Single ride 73.10 187.53 0 2,321 Number of taxi transactions whose number of passenger is one 
Taxi_Cash 44.07 111.20 0 1,603 Number of taxi transactions whose payment method is cash 
Taxi_Card 57.29 157.67 0 1,936 Number of taxi transactions whose payment method is credit card 
4.2. Empirical model 
  
Assessing the causal relationship between Uber and 
taxis poses an empirical challenge due to endogeneity. 
There are several potential sources of endogeneity that 
may lead to biased estimation. Firstly, there would be 
omitted variables that will potentially affect the demand 
for both Uber and taxis. Another potential source of 
endogeneity could be reverse causality or simultaneity 
bias because taxis and Uber interplay with each other. 
That is, taxi may affect the demand of Uber, as well as 
Uber influences the demand for taxis.  
To address the potential endogeneity problems, we 
employ 3SLS model, which combines two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) with seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR). The 3SLS approach estimates the full system of 
equations where endogenous variables in an equation 
are used as explanatory variables in other equations. It 
is widely adopted when dealing with endogeneity and 
contemporaneous cross-equation correlation between 
error terms [27, 29]. In particular, this approach is 
recommended to model a triangular structural 
relationship [28], allowing us to consider the 
simultaneous interaction between Uber and taxis. 
Specifically, we estimate the system of equations: 
    ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽11 ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽21 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+ 𝛽𝛽31 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−168 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖1 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 
    ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽12 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22 ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+ 𝛽𝛽32 ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−168 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is zip code-specific effects invariant over time, 
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 is time-specific effects common across regions, and 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a random error in zip code i in time t. The variables 
of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which are the frequency of pickup 
transactions of Uber and taxi, are log-transformed to 
mitigate negative skewness of its distribution, after 
adding one to account for zero values. We are primarily 
interested in 𝛽𝛽11 , which represents the percentage 
change in taxi transactions associated with one percent 
increase in Uber transactions. 
In addition, we include 168 hours (one week) lagged 
term as instrument variables. The instruments should be 
correlated with the endogenous regressor but 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable through any 
channel other than their effects via the endogenous 
regressor. Since there is much fluctuation in taxi and 
Uber transactions depending on day-of-week and time-
of-day, we believe that the demand for transportation 
before a week is more appropriate instruments for the 
current demand. 
Our model also allows for the dynamic nature of 
Uber and taxi pickups by including variables for lagged 
frequency of pickups between two successive hours. 
The current frequency of taxi and Uber pickups can be 
correlated with the past pickups in two opposite ways. 
On one hand, previous taxi pickups may reduce the 
probability of street hailing in the next hour. On the 
other hand, the demand for taxis and Uber can be 
concentrated in specific time periods, such as rush hour. 
In this case, the current taxi pickups will be positively 
correlated with the past pickup transactions. 
Furthermore, we can deal with time-series specific 
effects such as autocorrelation in the demand for taxis 
and Uber by including one hour lagged term of the 
dependent variables [1]. 
Unobserved local conditions such as geographical 
(e.g., tourist attractions), demographic (e.g., race, 
gender) and socioeconomic factors (e.g., income) may 
have heterogeneous effects on both Uber and taxi 
demands. To account for region-specific effects, zip 
code dummies are included. In addition, we also include 
date (183 days) and time-of-day (24 hours) dummies to 
control for time-specific transportation demands or 
unobserved factors (e.g., events).  
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Impact of Uber on taxi demand 
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To examine whether and how the frequency of Uber 
transactions affects the demand for taxis, we estimate 
the empirical model using our full sample of 838,872 zip 
code-hour observations, which pools 191 zip codes in 
NYC over six months in 2014. Table 2 reports our 
estimation results of the simultaneous competition 
between Uber and taxis. Each column in the table 
corresponds to a different regression.  
 
Table 2. Results of 3SLS estimation 
DV: 
Main Effect 
(H1) 
Borough 
(H2) 
Income 
(H3) 
(1) (2) (3) 
ln(Taxi) ln(Taxi) ln(Taxi) 
ln(Uber) 
-0.0120*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0007 
(0.0011) 
0.0002 
(0.0013) 
ln(Uber) ⨯ 
Manhattan  
-0.0145*** 
(0.0010) 
 
ln(Uber) ⨯ 
Middle-income   
-0.0063*** 
(0.0013) 
ln(Uber) ⨯   
High-income   
-0.0168*** 
(0.0012) 
ln(Taxi) (t-1) 
0.379*** 
(0.000959) 
0.378*** 
(0.000962) 
0.383*** 
(0.000958) 
ln(Taxi) (t-168) 
0.421*** 
(0.000958) 
0.421*** 
(0.000958) 
0.414*** 
(0.000962) 
DV: ln(Uber) ln(Uber) ln(Uber) 
ln(Taxi) 
-0.0311*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0129*** 
(0.0022) 
ln(Taxi) ⨯ 
Manhattan  
-0.0566*** 
(0.0018) 
 
ln(Taxi) ⨯ 
Middle-income   
-0.0144*** 
(0.0017) 
ln(Taxi) ⨯    
High-income   
-0.0789*** 
(0.0022) 
ln(Uber) (t-1) 
0.447*** 
(0.000792) 
0.446*** 
(0.000792) 
0.445*** 
(0.000791) 
ln(Uber) (t-168) 
0.478*** 
(0.000798) 
0.476*** 
(0.000799) 
0.477*** 
(0.000800) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; Region and time fixed 
effects are included; The baselines are outer boroughs in NYC 
(Column 2) and low-income areas (Column 3), respectively. * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Column 1 shows that Uber and taxis compete with 
each other by cannibalizing the other demand. The 
impact of Uber on overall taxi market is significantly 
negative, and the 10% increase in Uber pickups leads to 
the 0.12% decrease in overall taxi pickups, accepting the 
Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, the Uber pickups 
decrease by 0.31% as the taxi pickups increase by 10%. 
To explore the contingent effects upon market-
segments, we extend the baseline model by including 
interaction terms between focal independent variables 
(e.g., ln𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and dummy variables of borough and 
income level. We obtain data about average household 
income for each zip code from U.S. Census Bureau. We 
code a binary variable, 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀, as 1 if the zip code 
areas belong to that borough. In addition, we categorize 
zip code areas into three groups based on income 
distribution in NYC; 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 is defined as zip 
code areas which reside between the 25th ($60,564) and 
75th ($99,142) percentile of household income; and the 
remaining areas with higher and lower income are 
assigned into 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈  and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 , 
respectively. Note that the baselines are outer boroughs 
in NYC and low-income areas, respectively. 
Similarly to main terms, the interaction terms may 
be endogenous. For instance, the Uber transactions are 
endogenous in both Manhattan and outer boroughs in 
NYC, thus we need to address the endegeneity of 
interaction term. In the prior literature [5, 29], it is 
widely accepted to instrument interactions of 
endogenous variables with interactions with instruments. 
Following this approach, instead of using the interaction 
terms that may be endogenous , we reestimate the model 
by including the interaction terms with instruments. 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 provide intriguing 
findings that the Uber’s impacts on taxi demand are 
contingent upon borough and income level. In Column 
2, the impact of Uber on taxis in Manhattan is significant, 
but not in outer boroughs, supporting the Hypothesis 2. 
In Manhattan, the 10% increase in Uber pickups leads 
to the 0.14% decrease in taxi pickups. On the other hand, 
the impact of Uber on taxi market in low-income areas 
is insignificant and negligible (Column 3), whereas its 
impact is negatively significant in middle- and high-
income areas, supporting the Hypothesis 3. When the 
Uber pickups increase by 10%, taxi pickups decrease by 
0.17% in higher-income areas. 
 
5.2. Customer-segment analysis 
  
In order to investigate whether the effects of Uber 
vary depending on the characteristics of taxi customers, 
we split the taxi transactions based on its attributes: tip 
percentage, group ride, and payment method (see Table 
1 for summary statistics). Specifically, all taxi 
transactions whose ratio of tip to total fare (tip 
percentage) is above median are divided into large tip 
segment, or else into small tip segment. Also, all taxi 
transactions whose number of passenger, reported by 
drivers, is two or more are classified into group-ride 
segment, whose number of passenger is one is classified 
into single-ride segment. Cash and credit card segments 
are classified by payment for each taxi transactions.  
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Table 3. Results of customer-segment analysis 
DV: 
Cash vs. Credit Card (H4)  Small Tip vs. Large Tip (H5)  Group vs. Single (H6) 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
ln(Taxi_Cash) ln(Taxi_Card)  ln(Taxi_ 
Small tip) 
ln(Taxi_ 
Large tip) 
 ln(Taxi_ 
Group ride) 
ln(Taxi_ 
Single ride) 
ln(Uber) 
-0.0217*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.0187*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0168*** 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.0296*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0117*** 
(0.0007) 
ln(Taxi) (t-1) 
0.362*** 
(0.000980) 
0.368*** 
(0.000967) 
 
0.362*** 
(0.000978) 
0.372*** 
(0.000961) 
 
0.363*** 
(0.000979) 
0.372*** 
(0.000967) 
ln(Taxi) (t-168) 
0.407*** 
(0.000979) 
0.417*** 
(0.000967) 
 
0.410*** 
(0.000977) 
0.424*** 
(0.000960) 
 
0.406*** 
(0.000980) 
0.415*** 
(0.000965) 
DV:  ln(Uber) ln(Uber)  ln(Uber) ln(Uber)  ln(Uber) ln(Uber) 
ln(Taxi)_each 
subsample 
-0.0363*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0376*** 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.0346*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0392*** 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.0371*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0351*** 
(0.0013) 
ln(Uber) (t-1) 
0.446*** 
(0.000792) 
0.446*** 
(0.000792) 
 
0.446*** 
(0.000792) 
0.446*** 
(0.000792) 
 
0.445*** 
(0.000794) 
0.447*** 
(0.000791) 
ln(Uber) (t-168) 
0.477*** 
(0.000800) 
0.477*** 
(0.000799) 
 
0.477*** 
(0.000799) 
0.477*** 
(0.000799) 
 
0.477*** 
(0.000801) 
0.477*** 
(0.000799) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; Region and time fixed effects are included; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
We estimate the contingent effects of customer-
segment by regressing different transactions of taxi, 
separately, on Uber transactions. Table 3 reports our 
estimation results for the impacts of Uber on each 
customer segment. As shown in Columns 1 and 2, Uber 
seems to take more the demand of taxi customers who 
pay by cash than credit card, accepting Hypothesis 4. 
The 10% increase of Uber transactions causes the 0.22% 
and 0.16% decrease in taxi transactions whose payment 
method is cash and credit card, respectively, implying 
that the cashless payment of Uber is perceived as an 
important relative advantage over taxis. In Columns 3 
and 4, the negative impact of Uber on the taxi 
transactions with a small tip is significantly larger than 
those who pay a large tip (p < 0.05), as consistent with 
the Hypothesis 5. The 10% increase of Uber transactions 
leads to the 0.19% and 0.17% decrease in taxi pickup 
transactions with a large and small tip percentage, 
respectively. Thus, these results imply that ride-sharing 
services take more the demand of taxi customers who 
are more price-sensitive, due to Uber’s no-tipping 
policy. 
In Columns 5 and 6, we can accept the Hypothesis 7, 
as the demand elasticity of Uber for group taxi rides is 
more than twice as large as for single taxi rides. The 10% 
increase of Uber transactions is associated with the 0.30% 
and 0.12% decrease in group taxi ride and single taxi 
ride, respectively. The large difference between group 
and single taxi ride implies that perceived risk may play 
a critical role in customers’ attitude to new IT-enabled 
services and P2P-based sharing economy.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This study provides intriguing and encouraging 
findings of societal benefits of ride-sharing. Our 
findings demonstrated that the negative effect of Uber 
on taxi demand seems to be mainly driven by Manhattan 
and high-income areas, where most taxis are 
concentrated, although the Uber’s impact is 
insignificant in the outskirts (outer boroughs) and low-
income areas. The suburbs and low-income areas have 
been underserved by public transits and street-hail 
transportations [11, 34], possibly undermining the 
quality of life and social welfare. Figure 3 shows the 
trends of Uber transactions by income level during the 
sample period. The growth of Uber pickups is more 
evident in middle- and low-income areas, and the 
percentage of Uber transactions there has increased over 
time, contrary to taxis. Thus, our findings highlight that 
ride-sharing services can be effective in expanding 
transportation options in these underserved markets, 
without cannibalizing the demand for taxis there. 
This paper offers important contributions and 
implications to literature and practice. First, this study 
can contribute to the nascent literature on societal 
impacts of sharing economy. The availability of ride-
sharing can reduce the likelihood of alcohol-related 
motor vehicle fatalities [22] and also can reduce traffic 
congestion and excess fuel consumption [30]. Our work 
extends the evidence of the societal impacts of sharing 
economy by documenting the relationship between ride-
sharing and the incumbent taxi industry. 
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Figure 3. Trends in Uber pickups by income level 
 
Second, we documented the distinct impacts of Uber 
on taxi demand by region and income level. Rawls [38] 
proposes the social welfare measure based on the 
welfare level for the least well-off people in society, 
referred to as Rawlsian utility function. From the Rawls’ 
perspective, increasing social welfare of the lower-
income people can lead to the improve of overall social 
welfare. Thus, our study illustrates a new channel 
through which ride-sharing platforms improve social 
welfare beyond economic gains by expanding 
transportation options mostly in low-income areas 
without cannibalizing the taxi demand. This may 
reshape the ongoing dialogues on the sharing economy 
and inform democratic debate on ride-sharing and 
sharing economy that have been subject to much debate 
among researchers and policy makers. These differing 
impacts of ride-sharing by regions can provide a 
possible way for policy makers to reconcile the 
conflicting opinions from the traditional industry, 
consumers, and sharing economy players. 
Third, we attempted to differentiate types of taxi 
customers, providing managerial implications for 
sharing platform companies as well as traditional 
industry. Our findings imply that ride-sharing 
companies may need a target marketing strategy to 
effectively capture customer demands depending on 
customers’ characteristics. In addition, the results are 
encouraging for taxi industry because all markets are not 
cannibalized by the new competition with ride-sharing. 
This study is also not without limitations. First, our 
findings may be limited by the sample period in 2014, a 
relatively early stage of Uber growth in NYC. Given 
that the impacts of Uber may be depending on its growth 
phase, one should be cautious in generalizing our results 
to other periods or other cities which may experience 
different stages of ride-sharing adoption.  
In addition, our fine-grained analyses can effectively 
capture the short-term direct cannibalizing effects of 
ride-sharing services, though it may not capture the 
long-term impacts of ride-sharing on taxi industry, such 
as its structural change caused by Uber’s flexible labor 
supply model [12]. The total impacts of ride-sharing, 
including short-term and long-term effects, on taxi 
industry might be broader and greater than our estimates. 
Second, since NYC is one of the world’s largest 
cities and hosts many ride-sharing drivers, the effects of 
ride-sharing there might differ from those in other cities. 
In addition, different regulations for ride-sharing might 
affect their competitive relationship. Future studies 
could extend our empirical findings to other contexts, 
such as other cities and other countries. 
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